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Obfuscation is a commonly used technique to protect soft-
ware from the reverse engineering process. Advanced ob-
fuscations usually rely on semantic properties of programs
and thus may be performed on source programs. This raises
the question of how to be sure that the binary code (that is
effectively running) is still obfuscated.
This paper presents a data obfuscation of C programs and
a methodology to evaluate how the obfuscation resists to
the GCC compiler. Information generated by the compiler
(including effects of relevant optimizations that could deob-
fuscate programs) and a study of the disassembled binary
code, as well as a dynamic analysis of the performances of
binary code show that our obfuscation is worthwhile.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.0 [Software Engineering]: General—Protection mech-
anisms
Keywords
obfuscation, compiler optimization, anti-reverse engineering
1. INTRODUCTION
A well-known way of attacking a software is to start by
reverse engineering it in order to reconstruct the memory
layout using static or dynamic analysis tools operating over
disassembled or binary code. Software reverse engineering
is an active field of research and new reverse engineering
techniques are regularly published. Obfuscating a program
consists in transforming it into an equivalent program that
is more difficult to understand or to analyze. Among the ap-
plications of obfuscation is the protection of software from
reverse engineering. The numerous obfuscation techniques
range from elementary syntactic techniques such as insert-
ing opaque predicates to more sophisticated semantics-based
techniques such as complicating control flows [3].
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Improvements in reverse engineering call for improvements
in obfuscation. Obfuscation can be performed at different
levels of program representation: at the source level, on any
intermediate language or at the assembly or binary level. On
the one hand, many obfuscations are performed directly at
the binary or assembly level. It ensures that the code that
is running is obfuscated. On the other hand, obfuscating a
source program facilitates the design of advanced obfusca-
tions relying on semantic properties of source programs.
Obfuscating a source program raises the question of how
to be sure that the binary code (that is effectively running) is
still obfuscated. Obfuscations can be classified according to
two main categories, depending whether they mainly trans-
form the control flow of a program or its data [3]. Many
obfuscations related to control flow exist in the literature.
Data obfuscations mainly hide data in memory and can also
complicate the reverse engineering process.
This paper presents a data obfuscation of C programs and
a methodology to evaluate how the obfuscation resists to the
GCC compiler (including optimizations). This obfuscation
is an example of obfuscation that is easier to design at the
C level than at the assembly level. The obfuscation is hid-
ing data structure fields at the source level, so that it will
become much more difficult to reverse engineer the mem-
ory layout from a corresponding binary code. A detailed
study of the information generated by the compiler (includ-
ing effects of relevant optimizations that could deobfuscate
programs) and of the disassembled binary code, as well as
a dynamic analysis of the performances of obfuscated code
show that our obfuscation is worthwhile.
2. BACKGROUND
We now present our data obfuscation and explain how the
GCC compiler could possibly deobfuscate C programs.
2.1 A Data Obfuscation
Data obfuscations are usually classified according to the
transformation they perform [3]. A data obfuscation aims at
modifying the encoding of data, or the way data are stored,
or the aggregation of data or the ordering of data. Our data
obfuscation performs these four transformations.
It is detailed in Fig. 1 and replaces each field access having
a scalar type (e.g. t.a in the example program of Fig. 1)
by an address storing the current field value1. This address
is computed by a function called access (that is added to
the source program and detailed in Fig. 1). For instance,
1By default, all fields of C structures are replaced, but it is
also possible to obfuscate only some selected fields.
the field t.a is replaced by the address *access(). Thus,
the address of the current field is hidden in an array (called
access_array in Fig. 1) that is accessed from the auxil-
iary function access. This access array groups together the
whole field accesses of the program (e.g. its size is 4 in
Fig. 1). Moreover, a new indirection is added. The access
array is used to calculate indices of another array (called
address_array in Fig. 1) storing the different field values.
Furthermore, the function access is exchanging the field
values and updates accordingly the access array: at each
function call (i.e. each field access in the original program)
two field values are randomly chosen to be permutated.
struct test {int a;int b;};
int main (void){ /* Initial example program */
struct test t; int c;
t.a =10; t.b =20; c = t.a; return c + t.b;
} /*--------------------------------------------------------*/
int access_counter; /* Obfuscated code */
int access_array[4] = { 0, 1, 0, 1, };
int *address_array[2];
int rand_a_b(int a, int b) { ... } /* Returns an int in [a;b] */
int *access(){
int nb_elem = 2, id1, id2, t, *ptr;
id2 = rand_a_b(0, nb_elem);
id1 = rand_a_b(0, nb_elem);
t = **(address_array + id1);
**(address_array + id1) = **(address_array + id2);
**(address_array + id2) = t;
ptr = *(address_array + id1);
*(address_array + id1) = *(address_array + id2);
*(address_array + id2) = ptr;
access_counter = access_counter + 1;
return *(address_array + *(access_array + (access_counter-1)));
}




*(address_array + 1) = &t.b; *(address_array + 0) = &t.a;
*access()= 10; *access()= 20;
c = *access(); return (c + *access()); }
Figure 1: An example of obfuscated program
Finding all field accesses in a given C program is more
complex to perform at the assembly level, where the data
flow is more difficult to interpret. It requires to consider all
possible accesses via the registers, the stack and the rest of
the memory. Thus, we designed our obfuscation at the C
level that is better adapted than the assembly level.
2.2 Compiler Optimizations
Our obfuscation operates over C programs and we want to
be sure that the corresponding binary code is as obfuscated
as the source program. Consequently, we study the impact
of the compilation on our obfuscation. We focus on the GCC
compiler, as it is a widely used open compiler.
Among the great deal of compiler optimizations, we only
study the relevant ones performing inverse transformations
w.r.t. our obfuscation. As our obfuscation transforms scalar
field accesses, we chose to study two kinds of optimizations:
scalar reduction of aggregates (SRA) and scalar optimiza-
tions. SRA is the most relevant optimization as it trans-
forms all the fields of a structure into different independent
variables. Scalar optimizations rely on three basic optimiza-
tions: constant propagation, copy propagation and dead
code elimination. We want to be sure that they neither
transform the fields we obfuscate nor the statements that
our obfuscation adds in the original program.
As other optimizations do, SRA selects candidate fields
and rejects other fields of the program (e.g. a scalar field be-
longing to a structure having a pointer field). Then, among
the candidate fields, SRA selects fields that will be changed
and disqualifies the others (e.g. a field that is never accessed
during program execution). Thus, only some of the field
accesses are optimized by SRA. We then need to compare
these fields with those of the original program. This impact
analysis of SRA is also performed for scalar optimizations.
3. EVALUATION PROCESS
Our goal is to check that a binary obfuscated code is more
difficult to reverse engineer than its corresponding initial
program. Our method is general enough to be applied on
other obfuscations operating over source programs. It fol-
lows the three main steps that are detailed in this section.
3.1 Impact Analysis of the Compilation
We compile separately the original program and the obfus-
cated program. Each compilation is performed twice: with-
out any compiler optimization, as well as at the highest level
of optimization. Then, we study the impact of each opti-
mization on our obfuscation. Each optimization consists in
different compiler passes (at least an intraprocedural and an
interprocedural pass for the optimizations we have studied).
For each pass, we analyze the optimization details generated
by the compiler, in order to distinguish between the fields re-
maining obfuscated after the pass from the other optimized
fields. For scalar optimizations, we also track the optimized
expressions. Then, we compare these results with those of
the original program. Our global measure is the conserva-
tion rate of field accesses in the obfuscated program.
3.2 Analysis of Disassembled Binaries
The next analysis takes into account the assembling and
linking steps occurring after compilation, and checks that
all the transformations added by the obfuscation (e.g. the
permutation of values in an array) are still performed in
the binary code. Using the interactive dynamic analysis of
IDA Pro, the analysis compares the memory layout of the
original and the obfuscated programs. We chose the IDA
Pro tool because it is one of the most used tools for reverse
engineering binary files.
The BinDiff tool built on IDA Pro is also used to compare
two binary files and generate a similarity rate between both
files [5]. We use it to study separately the effects of the op-
timization and the obfuscation, as well as the effects of the
optimization on the obfuscation. Thus, we perform three
comparisons with BinDiff: between the original program and
the optimized program, between the original program and
the obfuscated program, and between the obfuscated pro-
gram and the optimized and obfuscated program.
3.3 Dynamic Binary Analysis
Instead of analyzing statically the impact of the compila-
tion, we could perform a dynamic binary analysis. A static
analysis is done once for each program, but a dynamic anal-
ysis is easier to implement, provided it scales to real-size
source programs and does not generate huge execution traces
that become impossible to interpret.
We used the Pin tool [10] to instrument obfuscated bi-
naries and check whether the compiler has compiled away
the obfuscation. Our Pin tool aims at collecting memory
access to the access array added by our obfuscation, as well
as the calls to the access function. Moreover, we also ob-
served that the obfuscated binaries cannot be easily reverse
engineered by such a dynamic binary instrumentation tool.
In addition, we reused our Pin tool to check that our
obfuscation resists to a different compiler. We chose the
Intel ICC compiler that is performing interprocedural opti-
mizations that could modify obfuscated programs more than
GCC can. The only difference we observed is the inlining
of functions added by our obfuscation. But, the data struc-
tures remain the same in the obfuscated code, thus showing
that compiled programs are still obfuscated.
Last, we also measured the increase of the execution time
when obfuscating programs. Even if the main goal of an
obfuscation is to have it resist reverse engineering analyses,
the loss in performance cannot be completely neglected [1].
When the execution time of the obfuscated binary is much
slower, the obfuscation is considered as unsatisfactory. Then,
we chose to obfuscate less fields and we obfuscated again the
initial program. This process was repeated until the execu-
tion times of the original and obfuscated programs become
close. When the execution trace is small enough to be inter-
preted, another solution to update the obfuscation is to use
the Pin tool in order to understand the discrepancy in the
execution times of both programs and select the fields that
will be obfuscated.
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Our benchmark for the impact analysis of the compilation
is the GCC testsuite devoted to optimizations. Our results
show that when a field is optimized in the original program,
it is never optimized in the obfuscated program.
Next, the analysis of disassembled binaries shows that all
the structure fields still exist in the obfuscated binary codes
(even if the program was optimized), as well as the auxiliary
variables and functions added by the obfuscation.
Last, we used the latest stable version of the GNU core-
utils utility suite as input to our performance analysis. The
size of programs ranges between 500 and 4800 lines. The
execution times of all obfuscated programs were similar to
those of their original programs, except for one program.
We then used Pin to help us improving our obfuscation.
5. RELATED WORK
There is an abundant literature on control flow obfusca-
tions. Data obfuscations were also designed mainly either
to hide specific data by encrypting them (e.g. see [4]) or
to diversify software by generating different binaries from a
same source program [2, 9, 8]. Data obfuscations operate
over C programs or over lower levels. For instance, the ob-
fuscation defined in [9] randomizes the ordering of fields in C
structures and inserts unused fields between them. Our ob-
fuscation shares similarities with the obfuscation described
in [1] that obfuscates both data location and data usage in
order to protect against malware detectors. However, the
transformations performed by their obfuscation differs from
ours as the obfuscation operates directly over binary code.
Since the general criteria (e.g. resilience) defined in [3]
for evaluating obfuscations, there is still no standard way of
evaluating the effectiveness of an obfuscation. Evaluations
based on static analysis exist [11, 6]. They rely on more
advanced static analysis techniques than those of IDA Pro
that we used, but to the best of our knowledge it is not clear
that they scale on large programs such as those we tested.
6. CONCLUSION
We have presented a data obfuscation that hides field ac-
cesses in an array that is modified at each field access and
hidden in a function. Indirect accesses to this array gener-
ate many pointers in obfuscated programs. Our obfuscation
operates over C programs. We have showed that it is robust
against compilation and very useful for programs manipu-
lating structure fields storing information that need to be
protected against reverse engineering tools.
Our experiments showed that reverse engineering of our
obfuscated programs is very hard because of the code that
is added by our obfuscation. It requires to analyze step by
step a great deal of array accesses in order to replace many
function calls by semantically equivalent array accesses.
We intend to conduct more experiments to test our ob-
fuscation against some automatic deobfuscators relying on
compiler optimizations such as those we have studied [7]. We
also intend to design a program analyzer that will be able
to automate some of the tedious tasks required to reverse
engineer obfuscated programs.
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